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ABSTRACT
This article describes a methodology to assess, during the early con-
ceptual design stage, the robustness, andmodularity of engineering
system architectures, which integrates concepts from network sci-
ence with engineering systems. The application specifically focuses
on the architecture of the power, propulsion, and cooling systems of
a naval ship. The methodology incorporates a binary Design Struc-
ture Matrix as the basis for an assessment of redundancy and modu-
larity effects on robustness, in response to the disruption of modules
in the architecture. Robustness is used to drive themodule selection,
which supports the formulation of a robust module configuration
subject to the level of redundancy in the system architecture. The
case study results demonstrated that redundancy promotes robust-
ness of the architecture and enables modularity; however, high
levels of redundancy in comparison to medium level redundancy
does not significantly improve robustness. The novel contribution
of this article relates to the combined quantitative assessment of
redundancy, modularity and robustness in a collective methodol-
ogy. This methodology supports conceptual design decision mak-
ing, allowing early prediction of compliance of requirements that
enable cost, development time and survivability targets to be
achieved.
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1. Introduction
Engineering systems is a field of research that ‘promotes the development of new
approaches [ . . . ] to analyse, design, deploy and manage these systems’ (De Weck, Roos,
and Magee 2011). The 80% lifecycle cost of a system is committed at an early concep-
tual stage (Duffy et al. 1993) which is the stage that the architecture of the system is
essentially decided. Crawley et al. (2004) defined system architecture as ‘an abstract expla-
nation for a system’s entities and the relationships between them’, which is designed to
CONTACT Giota Paparistodimou giota.paparistodimou@strath.ac.uk
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
180 G. PAPARISTODIMOU ET AL.
satisfy intended function, and also significantly decides the lifecycle attributes of the sys-
tem. Moullec, Jankovic, and Eckert (2016) highlighted that it is ‘ necessary to identify early
the concepts, and their underlying architectures, that are most likely to provide the best
trade-offs’.
Modularity and robustness are two desired lifecycle attributes of systems, as they are
strategic attributes to support business, development and operational requirements. Mod-
ularity is suggested to positively influence the lifecycle cost and the development time
of such complex engineering systems. Large-scale supply chain and the various manu-
facturing locations surrounding the development of engineering systems are some of
the reasons that have led to an increasing need for systems to be modularised, to facili-
tate their parallel manufacture, individual testing, the engagement of suppliers and sub-
contractors. Reuse, maintenance, upgrading and end of life reasons also motivate the
development of modular systems (Jose and Tollenaere 2005; Meehan, Duffy, and Whit-
field 2007). A modular design approach requires partitioning a system into modules. The
division and integration of the modules into a functional whole depends on the mod-
ular approach adopted and is critical to ensure the success of a modular system. Liter-
ature offers a wide range of modularity design methods and metrics (Bonvoisin et al.
2016) that are motivated by different modularity drivers. Modular design methods typ-
ically attempt to maximise modularity rather than to trade-off modularity with other
attributes of the systems. However, the identification of modules that have the best trade-
offs amongst additional, perhaps conflicting requirements, may not entail maximising
modularity.
Robustness is an essential attribute for engineering systems as it is an architectural
aspect of resilience (Department of Defense 2011), thus constitutes a vital design objec-
tive when developing large-scale engineering systems. Robustness reflects on both the
resilience and survivability of the complex system in the architectural level (Department
of Defense 2011; Kott and Abdelzaher 2016). The USA Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (2015) acknowledged that ‘today’s
space architectures designed and deployed under conditions more reflective of nuclear
war-fighting deterrence than conventional war-fighting sustainability, lack, in general, the
robustness that would normally be considered mandatory in such vital war-fighting ser-
vices’. Redundancy is a key design approach that promotes the robustness of systems.
Modularity and redundancy are inherently conflicting concepts, as redundancy typically
introduces connectivity in systems, whereas modularity intends to minimise connectivity
between modules.
This article proposes amethodology to assess the impact of redundancy andmodularity
on the robustness in large-scale distributed engineering system architectures during the
early conceptual stage of design. A robust modular methodology is developed to support
the process of architecting to understand potentially conflicting requirements and take
decisions in the right direction towards achieving better trade-offs.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature back-
ground relating to modularity, robustness, redundancy and concludes by identifying the
need for a robust modular methodology. Section 3 presents the robust modular system
architecture methodology. Section 4 evaluates the methodology by applying it on a naval
distributed engineering system architecture and discusses the findings. Section 5 provides
conclusions and directions for future research.
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2. Background literature onmodularity, robustness and redundancy
Literaturewas used to frame the research boundaries and introduce themain research con-
structs: modularity, robustness and redundancy. The system architecture is defined as the
unit of analysis, and the modularity, robustness and redundancy are properties of the sys-
tem architecture. Table 1 presents a consolidation of definitions, methods and metrics to
introduce the literature.
Hölttä-Otto et al. (2012) stated: ‘a system has a degree of modularity’, acknowledging
that modularity is not a binary quantity. Thus, by clustering of components based on the
degree of interactions that is maximised internally within group (modules) and minimised
externally between groups (modules) (Whitfield, Smith, and Duffy 2002), a highly modular
system architecture is formulated. The characterisation of the degree ofmodularity in a sys-
temarchitecture is performedusingmodularitymetrics. Variousmodularitymetrics exists in
the literature as shown in Table 1. Guo andGershenson (2004) proposed a normalisedmod-
ularity metric. Hölttä-Otto et al. (2012) highlighted that a normalised modularity metric is
an improvement because it canbeused to compare thedegree ofmodularity amongdiffer-
ent sizes of system architectures. In this article, the main criteria in deciding themodularity
metric to be used in the proposed methodology was normalisation, to allow comparisons
of the level of modularity amongst different system architectures.
Chen and Crilly (2016) acknowledged that there are two different types of robustness:
architectural and behavioural. Architectural robustness reflects: ‘the relationship between
architecture (whichmight be the architecture of a system, system type, state, or behaviour)
and function’. By contrast, they stated for behavioural robustness, that it is ‘concerned only
with the architecture it (characterised as regularities inbehaviour)’. Gero andKannengiesser
(2004) established that structure drives behaviour. This is interpreted in the context of this
research, as architecture (structure) drives robustness as a structural driven behavioural
property of an engineering system. The definition proposed is that robustness is the abil-
ity of an instantiated system architecture to support a level of functional continuity post
disruption.
Redundancy is a well-established approach to improve the robustness of engineering
systems. ISO 24765 (2010) defined redundancy as: ‘the presence of auxiliary components
in a system to perform the same or similar functions as other elements for the purpose
of preventing or recovering from failures’. Redundancy is also defined as the presence of
‘independent alternative paths between source and demand nodes which can be used to
satisfy supply requirements during disruption or failure of the main paths’ (Goulter 1987;
Yazdani and Jeffrey 2012). ISO 24765 (2010) defines redundancy in relation to auxiliary
components that are included whereas Goulter (1987) relates to additional connectivity
between sources anddemandcomponents. Redundancydesign is definedhere as architec-
tural (components and their connections) options in the instantiated system architecture
that are capable of satisfying the same function.
2.1. The need formethods to analyse redundancy andmodularity’s impact on
robustness during the early conceptual design
Technical systems aredesigned to satisfy functionsby exhibiting thedesiredbehaviour that
arises from their structure (Gero and Kannengiesser 2004). Redundancy and modularity
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Table 1. Consolidated literature review on modularity, robustness and redundancy.
Modularity Robustness Redundancy
Definition ‘“systems” property of being made up of modules. A module is
a system’s element that presents a high, albeit not complete,
independence of other elements’ (Miraglia 2014)
‘the maintenance of some desired system charac-
teristics despite fluctuations in the behavior of its
component parts or its environment’ (Carlson and
Doyle 2002)
‘the provision of additional capacity in a system, so
that system performance is maintained despite
partial system failure’ (Chen and Crilly 2014)
Methods Minimumdescription length theory based-methods (Yu, Yassine, and
Goldberg 2007; Helmer, Yassine, and Meier 2010), Weighted and
directed network-based method (Li et al. 2016), Multi-objective
modular architecture method (Sanaei et al. 2017)
Decision-based (Malak, Baxter, andHsiao 2015), System
robustness (Zakarian, Knight, and Baghdasaryan
2007), Semi-analytical approach to robust design
(Andersson 1996)
Design for function redundancy (Umeda et al.
1996), Resilient architecture of a cyber-physical
production system method (Tomiyama and
Moyen 2018)
Metrics Module strength indicator (Whitfield, Smith, and Duffy 2002),
Singular value modularity index (Hölttä-Otto and de Weck 2007),
Social network centrality (Sosa, Eppinger, and Rowles 2007),
Normalised modularity metric (Guo and Gershenson 2004),
New modularity indices (Jung and Simpson 2017), Alternative
modularity measure (Sinha, Suh, and de Weck 2018)
Sensitivity robustness metrics, Size of feasible design
space robustness metrics, Functional expectancy
and dispersion robustness metrics; Probability of
compliance robustness metrics (Göhler, Eifler, and
Howard 2016)
Clustering coefficient, Meshedness coefficient
(Yazdani and Jeffrey 2012), Redundancy
Distribution Index, Redundancy Magnitude Index
(Elmaraghy et al. 2012)
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are formulated in the structure of the system. Robustness is a behavioural property of
the system that is dependent of the structure. The literature is sparse with respect to
the relationship between redundancy, modularity and robustness. Hölttä, Eun Suk, and
de Weck (2005) advised that high modularity penalises system performance. Mehrpouyan
et al. (2014) stated that ‘isolation of failures into a single module typically makes the sys-
tem less robust’. Walsh, Dong, and Tumer (2019) identified that there is ‘tradeoff between
modularity and robustness in the design of engineering systems’.
The influence of modularity and redundancy on the robustness of a system is acknowl-
edged in the literature (Fricke and Schulz 2005; Slagle 2007). Redundancy is accepted as a
means to increase the robustness of systems. Fricke and Schulz (2005) and Ross, Rhodes,
and Hastings (2008) recognised the tension between modularity and redundancy in terms
of connectivity. Mehrpouyan et al. (2014) argued that ‘to design a robust system and to
recommend or oppose the modular physical system architecture, it is utterly important to
understand the architectural properties of complex engineered systems’.
Although the potential trade-offs between redundancy, modularity and robustness are
recognised, a collective quantitative methodology that analyses them together does not
exist in the engineering design literature. Browning (2016) surveyed the design struc-
ture matrix (DSM) literature, including modularity metrics and methods, while Bonvoisin
et al. (2016) studied modular product design literature systematically, neither review
reported a robustness related modularity method. This article addresses this gap by devel-
oping a robust modular methodology to quantitatively assess the redundancy and mod-
ularity effects on the robustness of a system architecture during the early conceptual
stages.
3. A robust modular system architecture assessment methodology
Section 3 presents the research solution, which is the robust modular system architec-
ture assessment methodology illustrated in Figure 1. The methodology intents to support
system architects during the early stages of conceptual design, to analyse the trade-offs
between the different levels of redundancy, modularity, and robustness for system archi-
tecture. Such early assessment can better inform decisions on the most appropriate level
of redundancy and modularity to achieve desired robustness in the system architecture.
The methodology aids on the formulations of a robust modular configuration, establish-
ing a modularisation of the architecture that will not jeopardise the robustness of system
due to disruption of amodule. Themethodology is divided into four stages: input, analysis,
evaluation, and selection as shown in Figure 1.
The input stage of the methodology requires inputs by the system architect. The
methodology requires as inputs: the description of the system architecture in a binary DSM
form, definition of system’s main function, sub-functions, an initial definition of level of
redundancyandaprimarydefinitionof the sets of source and sink components correspond-
ing to sub-functions. The system architecture is modelled in a binary directional DSM. The
directed network in combination with the sources and sinks represents the function view-
point of the systemarchitecture,whereas the edges of thenetwork represent flows (energy,
material, flow) and nodes of the components. The flow network with the definition of the
source and sink components is termed the functional viewpoint as discussed in Section
3.1.1 and shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Robust modular system architecture assessment methodology (colour online).
The analysis stage of the methodology consists of three embedded loops: the redun-
dancy loop, modularity loop, and disruption loop that encapsulate the structural and
robustness computations. The analysis stage of themethodology is computational offering
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a time-efficient quantitative approach to simultaneously examine modularity and robust-
ness. Themain instrument toperform the computational analysis stageof themethodology
is the establishment of the directed network through its transformation from a DSM into a
mathematical adjacencymatrix. The direct network is transformed into undirected network
that is the basis for the structural computations in the modularity loop.
The structural computations are performed through the modularity loop and generate
the classification of modules. In the structural undirected network, the edges represent
tangible structural connections amongst components, and represent the structural view-
point Section 3.1.2 as noted in Figure 1. The intermediatemodularity loop uses the stability
method, which is tuneable through a resolution parameter, allowing the generation of
different modular configurations corresponding to different levels of modularity of the
architecture.
The robustness computations utilise a disrupted exponential matrix with the known
sources and sinks and are realised through the disruptive inner loop. The direct network
is transformed into an exponential matrix that forms the basis to perform the robustness
computation in the disruptive loop. The exponential matrix represents the behavioural
viewpoint as discussed in Section 3.1.3 as noted in Figure 1, requires the definition of the
source and sink to enable the robustness calculation. The disruption simulations disrupt
modules that correspond at different levels of modularity that are generated through the
modularity intermediate loop. This becomes a link between the structural and behavioural
viewpoints of the system architecture.
The analysis stage continues iterating through three embedded loops: the redundancy
loop, modularity loop, and disruption loop as per recommendations of Design of Experi-
ments (DOE) or as the architect (user) prefers. The analysis stage is concluded by tabulating
the robustness results for a given level of redundancy, modularity, and disruption. The
tabulated robustness results inform the evaluation stage of the methodology.
In the evaluation stage, the formulation of a robustmodular configuration of the system
architecture fordifferent levels of redundancy is reformulatedbasedon theoutcomesof the
methodology. At this stage, the methodology advocates reformulating a robust modular
configuration for a given a level of redundancy by combining robustmodules identified for
different levels of modular configuration. The robust modular reconfiguration principle is
that a robust module of higher modularity is preferable if the module disruption does not
penalise the robustness of the architecture.
The methodology supports the selection of robust modules generated by the stability
method for different levels of modularity. Alternative modularity approaches rely on gen-
eratingmodular configurations bymaximising the degree of modularity without reflecting
on the generatedmodule’s impact on the robustness of the systemarchitecture under their
disruption. Themethodology recommends that modules should be selected and gathered
together to form a modular configuration on the basis that a module disruption does not
compromise functional continuity, thus ensuring robustness of architecture, rather than
on maximising the degree of modularity of the architecture. One of the novelties of this
research is that the robustness drives the selection of modules from the set of the various
modular configurations and that different levels of redundancy can be considered.
The evaluation stage of themethodology focuses on supporting a decision-making pro-
cess of the choices in a trade-off between the desired levels of modularity and redundancy.
The evaluation stage allows the expert (user) preferences and input to be considered.
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Figure 2. Network A and B examples.
The methodology explains the steps to formulate the robust modular configuration based
on the analysis stage outputs. DOE is also recommended to provide a framework for the
applicationof themethodology as it can recommend thenumber of iterations of the redun-
dancy – modularity – disruptive loops of the analysis stage. In a DOE analysis modularity
and redundancy are viewed as the design variables whereas robustness is considered the
response variable.
The final selection stage is that the user decides if the outcome results are satisfactory. If
the outcomes of the DOE and the generated robustmodular configuration are not satisfac-
tory, a completely new system architecture should be devised and reassessed. Two simple
network examples are provided to support the explanation of the methodology as seen in
Figure 2. These examples have similarities with the power distribution system that is dis-
cussed in Section 4 and they provide a preliminary exposition of the methodology and its
constructs.
3.1. Inputs
A binary DSM (Browning 2016) was used to model the distributed system architecture and
was an initial input for the methodology. Additionally, the main function and the num-
ber of sub-functions that the architecture was designed to also support are required to
be identified at the beginning of the methodology. The definition of function relates with
the connectivity amongst sink and source, for example in Networks A and B a level of
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power function is satisfied if any source is connected to any sink. The proposed method-
ology models the system architecture using three viewpoints: functional, structural, and
behavioural.
3.1.1. Functional viewpoint
A system architecture that is conceived during early conceptual stages is represented as
a schematic synthesis of functional elements and their interconnections modelled as a
directed graph. Components of the system architecture correspond to functional elements
and are represented as nodes, and functional flows (such as material or energy or flow) are
the connections that are represented as directed edges. Figure 1 illustrates the step in the
methodology, that the system architecture is represented in a functional computational
view as a directed graph.
3.1.1.1. Sources and sink component identification. A preliminary input in themethod-
ology is the definition of source and sinks components. This is required in combinationwith
the definition of the directed network in order to define the functional view. This is in line
with the notion that a functional continuity is satisfied if sufficient connectivity between
sources and sinks exists after disruption. Associating sources and sinks of a directed graph
with a function becomes the criterion that is assessed in the behavioural viewpoint. Figure
2 the Networks A sources are nodes 1 and 2 whereas nodes 7 and 8 are sinks and for B the
sources are nodes 1, 2, 3, 4 and nodes 9 and 10 are sinks.
3.1.2. Structural viewpoint
An undirected network represents the structural connectivity among components and is
generated by transforming the flow network (generated by architects through the con-
struction of the DSM) into being undirected. This undirected network represents tangible
physical connections such as cables and pipes. In the methodology, the initial input is
defined to be a flow directed network that is mathematically transformed into an undi-
rected and symmetrical structural network. In case that the flow connections do not corre-
spond to tangible structural connections, such as the flow of information across a wireless
network, then a structural network should also be included as an initial input. In analysis
stage Figure 1 depicts the point that the system architecture is represented in a structural
computational view (undirected network) which indicates the start of the modularity loop.
3.1.3. Behavioural viewpoint
Abehavioural network ismodelled as anexponentialmatrix,which capturesdirect and indi-
rect connections with the purpose of assessing the robustness of the system architecture.
The exponentialmatrixmodels the connectivity among components directly and indirectly
(at any number of steps of connectivity). This means that the exponential matrix becomes
the mathematical basis to assess robustness by determining if the source and sink compo-
nents remain connected (in anynumberof steps). The sufficiencyof the level of connectivity
amongst source and sinks is evaluated through the redundancy threshold criterion (RTC).
In the disruption loop shown in Figure 1 denotes the stage that the system architecture is
represented in a behavioural computational view through the exponential matrix, which
forms the mathematical basis for the robustness computation.
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3.2. Analysis stage of themethodology
The analysis stage of the methodology constitutes of two parts the structural and robust-
ness computation and includes three embedded iterative loops: redundancy loop, mod-
ularity loop, and disruption loop as illustrated in the analysis stage of Figure 1. The fol-
lowing sections elaborate on the redundancy, modularity, and robustness loops of the
methodology.
3.2.1. Redundancy loop
The redundancy loop of the methodology lies between the preliminary input stage and
analysis stage. The redundancy level variations in the architecture are considered to reflect
on the structural viewpoint of the architecture thus, is positioned on the structural com-
putation part of the analysis stage. The redundancy in the system architecture is varied
using the RTC that defines the required level of connectivity amongst source and sink
components to satisfy function, and by changing the number of the main supply/source
components and number of interconnections which reflect on the architectural options.
Varying the level of redundancy changes the structure, in spite that comparable architec-
tures are suggested to be developed for each iteration of the redundancy loop that only
differentiates in respect to their redundant character.
3.2.1.1. Identify source and sink components corresponding to function. A set of
source (supply) and sink (demand) components that relates to a functional requirement are
identified as input for the methodology as shown in Figure 1. This is required for the cal-
culation of the robustness evaluation indicator metric. The proposition is that the source
components are required to maintain connectivity with sink components, to satisfy func-
tional continuity after a disruption. With respect of the example presented in Figure 2 for
Network Type A, if any of source {1,2} and sinks {7,8} are connected, it is assumed that the
function is maintained at acceptable levels, and this is the same for Network Type B, for any
of the source {1,2,3,4} and sinks {9,10}.
3.2.1.2. Determining the level of redundancy in the architecture. Two constructs are
proposed to determine the redundancy of the architecture. The first is the RTC and the
second is the functional hierarchy and architectural options diagram.
3.2.1.2.1. Redundancy threshold criterion. The RTC indicates the ratio of connectivity
amongst an individual set of source and sinks components that are sufficient to satisfy a spe-
cific level of functional requirements in the system architecture. The RTC is derived based
on the level of redundancy in the connectivity of the architecture and is considered as a
design variable during the implementation of the methodology. The RTC acts as an eval-
uation criterion, assessing if the remaining connectivity among an individual set of source
and sink components is sufficient to satisfy functional continuity. Thus RTC defines the suf-
ficient level of connectivity which can support function. The RTC requires to be defined by
the user and is expected to be different for different operational demands. In the method-
ology is suggested that the redundancy first loop treats RTC as an input (or assumption),
the 2nd and 3rd redundancy loops are the loops where the level of redundancy is treated
as a design variable, by alternating the level of redundancy of the system architectures.
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The evaluation indicator catalogues robustness values that only exceed the pre-defined
RTC. For example, if a system has triple redundancy, the RTC is defined as 0.33, and for
quadruple redundancy, it is defined as 0.25. To test the various combinations of sources,
all cases with a common number of sources available (i, say) are grouped together, and the
fraction of cases that satisfies the RTC is used to calculate the robustness. By varying the RTC
and recalculating the robustness evaluation indicator metric, the effects of redundancy on
the robustness of the system can be determined.
The RTC is controlled by the architect, as is considered as a design variable, within the
methodology. For Network Type A, (the RTC was defined as 100% amongst the individual
set of source and sinks, meaning that source {1} should remain connected 100% with sink
{7} or source {2} should remain connected 100%with sink {8}). For Network Type B, the RTC
was defined as 50% amongst the set of source and sinks meaning that for the set of source
{1, 2} connectedwith sinks {9} is required only 50% connectivity to achieve the satisfactory
function, respectively RTC is 50% connectivity is required amongst the sources {3, 4} to sink
{10} to satisfy function.
3.2.1.2.2. Functional hierarchy andarchitectural options. A second construct proposed in
this article is the functional hierarchy and architectural options diagram. This captures the
high level of redundancy that entails the design of additional architectural options to sat-
isfy sub-functions. In complex system architecture, there is often a hierarchy of functions
that can be satisfied through various architectural options. This is illustrated in Figure 3
that architectural options are characterised as ‘AND’, ‘OR’. Architectural options are viewed
as a segment of the architecture that individually can satisfy a sub-function. If more than
one architectural option is designed to satisfy the same sub-function that constitute as an
architecture option (‘OR’) designed for redundancy in the architecture.
Figure 3. Functional hierarchy, architectural options, and RTC.
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Figure 3 reflects on the functional hierarchy and architectural options illustrating how
they are designed in the structure of the system. This hierarchy of main functions and
its sub-functions, and the definitions of ‘AND’, ‘OR’ shown in Figure 3 should be defined
by the users. The functional hierarchy and architectural option representation can be var-
ied through the redundancy loops to investigate how the different functional hierarchy,
architectural options, and RTC affect the robustness of the architecture.
‘OR’ reflects on the additional architectural optional designed for redundancy, The RTC
reflects in designing for redundancy in relation to additional connectivity, whereas archi-
tectural options reflect redundancy in relation to an additional set of source and sink
components.
Network A has two architectural options: option 1 is the set of source and sink {source:
1, sink: 7} and architectural option 2 is {source: 2, sink: 8}. Network A has four options:
{source:1, sink:9}, {source:2, sink:9}, {source:3, sink:10}, {source:4, sink:10}.
3.2.2. Modularity loop
Themethodology allows the identification of potentialmodules, which is flexible and tune-
able, allowing for different levels of modularity. The stability method was used due to
the inclusion of a resolution parameter, which allows the consideration of modularity as
a design variable. This allows the degree of modularity to be varied through the manipula-
tion of this parameter. The modularity loop as indicated in Figure 1 is part of the structural
computations of the analysis stage.
3.2.2.1. Stability method. The stability method formulates a quality function that cap-
tures the persistence of clusters in time (Fortunato 2010). A cluster is persistent about a
random walk (a walk in a network is a series of edges, not necessarily distinct) after t time
steps if the probability that the walker escapes the cluster before t steps is low. The proba-
bility is computed via the clustered auto-covariance matrix Rt , which, for a partition of the
network in c clusters, is defined in Equation (1):
Rt = HT (ΠMt − πTπ)H, (1)
whereH is an n× cmembershipmatrix where elementHij equals one, if node i is in cluster j
and is zero otherwise;M is the transition matrix of the randomwalk;Π the diagonal matrix
whose elements are the stationary probabilities of the randomwalk:
Πii = ki2m , (2)
with ki: the degree of node i; π is the vector whose entries are the diagonal elements of .
Thus, the quantity (Rt)ij expresses the probability for the walk to start in cluster i and end
up in cluster j after t steps, minus the stationary probability that two independent random
walkers are in i and j.
In this way, the persistence of a cluster i is related to the diagonal element (Rt)ii.
The stability of the clustering is defined by:
r(t;H) = min
0≤s≤t
c∑
i=1
Rsii = min0≤s≤t trace[Rs]. (3)
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For a given t, the aim is to maximise the stability. For t = 0, the most stable partition is that
in which all vertices are their own cluster while for t = 1, maximising stability is equivalent
tomaximising Newman–Girvanmodularity. Time can be considered as a resolution param-
eter, and the advantage of this method is that the resolution can be tuned by treating time
as a continuous variable (Fortunato 2010).
Martelot andHankin (2013) stated: ‘the stability optimisation canbe seenas anextension
ofmodularity optimisation that doesnot alter thegraphor the importanceof thenull factor,
but instead exploits the graph by interpreting it as a Markov process’.
The specific version of algorithm used in this methodology, was the fast multi-scale
detection of communities using stability optimisation as described by Martelot and Han-
kin (2013). This method uses a resolution parameter to tune the algorithm, in order to
identify modules that are not necessarily maximising modularity but correspond to dif-
ferent levels of modularity. Another reason of using this method, was that it does not
involve defining in advance a specific number of clusters (Fortunato 2010; Martelot and
Hankin 2013).
For the examples of Figure 2, using the stability method for Network A, allowed four
modules tobe identified:Module 1 (1, 4 nodes);Module 2 (1, 3 nodes);Module 3 (5, 7 nodes);
and Module 4 (6, nodes). For Network B also four modules were identified: Module 1 (1, 3,
and 5 nodes); Module 2 (2, 4, and 6 nodes); Module 3 (7, 9 nodes); and Module 4 (8, 10
nodes).
3.2.2.2. Modularity metric. The Newman modularity index, Q (Newman 2010) is a met-
ric that originates from network science but has been used in a number of engineering
applications (Sinha and Suh 2017). It is defined as:
Q =
k∑
i=1
(eii − a2i ) (4)
where eii represents the fraction of edges with both end nodes in the samemodule i (intra-
module interfaces) and ai the fraction of edges with at least one end node inside module i
(inter-module interfaces). Here k is the number of modules.
Magee, Whitney, and Moses (2010) suggested a normalised Newmanmodularity metric
to allow fair comparison among different size networks.
A parameter f is introduced:
f = 1 − (p − 1)
m
, (5)
where p is the number of sub-groups and m is the total number of edges of the network.
The normalised version of the Newmanmodularity metric is given by:
Qn =
∑k
i=1(eii − a2i )
f −∑ki=1(a2i ) , (6)
Since normalisation of the metric allows comparisons among architectures of different
sizes it is the one selected to be incorporated in the proposed methodology of this article.
Themetric is used toassess the level ofmodularity of the systemarchitecture, and it requires
as input the modular configuration and the undirected network (symmetric and binary
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adjacency matrix). Network A has the degree of modularity calculated as 0.67, whereas for
Network B it was 0.77.
3.2.2.3. Structural classification. The network theory concept of eccentricity was
adapted to suggest a classification for modules. The node eccentricity v is the greatest dis-
tance between node v and any other node. The diameter d of a network is defined to be the
maximal value of node eccentricity and the radius r is the minimum value. A central node
in a network of radius r is onewhose eccentricity is r and a peripheral node is any nodewith
eccentricity equal to the diameter d (Estrada and Knight 2015). The concept of eccentricity
was adapted to classifymodules by determining the smallest and largest diameters of each
module, and as shown in Table 2,modules are categorised into central, semi-peripheral and
peripheral classes.
Due to the simplicity of Network A themodules were classified as central and periphery.
For Network B, Module 1 (1, 3, 5 nodes) and Module 2 (2, 4, 6) were classified as central
modules, whilst Module 3 (7, 9 nodes) and Module 4 (8, 10) were classified as periphery
modules.
3.2.3. Disruption loop
The objective of the methodology is to modularise the architecture in a way that any sin-
gle module disruption does not stop the system functionality thus does not jeopardise
the robustness of the architecture. The disruption loop aid on identify how the disruption
of the generated modules will affect the robustness to the architecture. In this way, the
disruption loop is informed by the modularity loop, and includes the robustness computa-
tions. The disruptions are required inputs to calculate the robustness. Disruptions involved
disturbances of components and connections of the system architecture. Disruptions are
considered as generic (without knowledge of the cause).
In this methodology, the focus is the disruptions of modules. Disruption can relate to
damage of several or all components within a module due for example to explosion, frag-
mentation, or fire. For example, in naval ships, from a survivability viewpoint it is expected
that a single disruption event can result in the loss of a number of components and connec-
tions. If the system architecture is modularised, then a single disruption event may cause
the loss of a module. Module disruption is simulated within the methodology through
the removal of the nodes and edges within the exponential matrix. The probability that
a disruption will occur, or the type of disruption, are not specifically investigated.
The main disruption scenario of the methodology which involves each module within
themodular configuration to be consecutively disrupted is termed as Class 1. The structural
classification of modules can inform other disruption scenarios such as a Class 2 scenario
where only the centralmodulewithin the configuration is beingdisrupted. Class 3 andClass
4 relate to disruptions to peripheral and semi-peripheral module disruption respectively.
Table 2. Classification of modules.
Classification of modules
Central Peripheral Semi-peripheral
Modules’ diameter equals the smallest
diameter amongst the modules.
Modules’ diameter equals the largest
diameter amongst the modules.
Modules that are neither central nor
peripheral
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The formulation of disruption scenarios provides the basis on the classification of modules
that may provide additional insight to the role of classes of modules in system architecture
and their effects on the robustness of the system architecture.
The disruptions are formulated based on the generated modules from the stability
method for the different levels of modularity. That means that for different modular con-
figuration in the system architecture different disruptions are developed. The disruptions
provide a basis to assess in what way different modules affect the robustness of the
architecture, aiding in selecting an appropriate robust modular configuration.
In general, there are wide ranges of potential disruptions thatmust be considered in the
design of a system. The effect of any disruption will depend on the architecture, which it is
applied. The aimwas to link non-specific disruptionswith amodular architecture, providing
a new approach to assess the generated modules.
3.2.4. Robustness evaluation for given redundancy, modularity and disruptions
The notion that a function can be satisfied if a set of source and sink components of the flow
networkmaintain sufficient connectivity after a disruption is accepted in order to formulate
the robustness evaluation indicator metric. The following paragraphs present the robust-
ness evaluation indicator metric which is an updated version from an earlier formulation
developed by Paparistodimou et al. (2019).
3.2.4.1. Measuring connectivity among sources and sinks before and after disruption.
For a system architecture that is represented by a directed network G, and has an adja-
cencymatrix A, a newmatrix S is constructed, a binary matrix that catalogues the existence
of paths/walks (of any length) between nodes in the network. Amathematical way to com-
pute S is to first compute the matrix exponential eA. Estrada and Knight (2015) stated that
an entry of the exponential matrix is nonzero if and only if there is a path in the network
between nodes i and j. We then form a matrix S using the identities:
Sij =
{
1, (eA)ij > 0,
0, otherwise.
(7)
S can be interpreted as determining the structurally driven behavioural robustness of the
system architecture.
Sets of e sourcess = {s1, s2, s3, . . . , se} and k sinks t = {t1, t2, t3, . . . , tk} are chosen in sys-
tem architectures, and the number of 1s in the corresponding intersection of rows and
columns of S is computed. The proportion of 1s gives a measure of the interconnectivity
between the sources and sinks of the network. This can be recalculated after the net-
work is subject to disruption (i.e. loss of nodes or edges). The measure works equally on
directed and undirected networks. More precisely, the robustness Rst of the intact system
architecture is measured using:
Rs,t(G) =
∑e
i=1
∑k
j=1 Sij(si, tj)
ek
, (8)
A disruption (loss of nodes/edges) generates a damaged system architecture represented
by a network G′ with adjacency matrix A′. Robustness is recalculated by evaluating the
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connectivity among sources and sinks after disruption to give:
Rs,t(G
′) =
∑e
i=1
∑k
j=1 S′ij(si, tj)
ek
. (9)
Equation (9) is computed for all non-empty subsets of S. Equation (9) is compared against
the threshold redundancy criterion (RTC) generating the robustness evaluation indicator
values, which if greater than the RTC are recorded as successful and values less than RTC
are recorded as failures (zero value).
3.2.4.2. Average of a weighted combination of operational sources. For e source com-
ponents, all 2e − 1 combinations of operational sources are tested (excluding the case of
all sources unavailable as that inevitably leads to loss of functional continuity). For ease of
use, the information contained in the individual values of the robustness is condensed into
a single term. This is achieved by calculating a weighted average where the robustness of
operational sources Ri is weighted by a value that is proportional to the number of states
with i sources operational and is represented by the reciprocal of the binomial coefficient
wi = (e−i)!i!e! . Alternative experts’ input could also be used to define the weight values(wi).
Therefore, the weighted robustness Rw is calculated as:
Rw = 1e
e∑
i=1
wiRi. (10)
3.2.4.3. Total robustness evaluation indicator metric. Figure 3 presented in Section 3
illustrated the functional hierarchy and architectural options that are designed in the sys-
tem architecture. The robustness evaluation indicator metric shown in Equation (9) is
therefore, calculated for each architectural option.
At the sub-function level, the robustness is calculated in the following way: If a sub-
function is designed for redundancy of architectural options (OR) then the robustness of
the sub-function is calculated throughanalgebraicmean. If sub-function is notdesigned for
redundancy the architectural option (AND) the robustness of the sub-function is calculated
by the geometric mean.
Finally, the robustness is represented by Equation (11) below relates to a main function-
ality of the system as awhole. The geometricmean of the sub-function robustness values is
used togenerate anoverall robustnessmeasure for thewhole system, since if any individual
value is zero (whichmeans the relevant sub-function has failed) then the overall robustness
is then automatically equal to zero, given sub-functions are interdepended to satisfy the
main function.
For a system with interdependent functions enumerated l = 1, . . . , q with correspond-
ing robustness R(l) the total robustness is given by
Rtotal =
q∏
l=1
q
√
Rs,t(l). (11)
Equation (11) is applicable for sub-functions that must at the same time be in opera-
tion for the main function to be satisfied, thus interdependent functions. It is noted that a
component could simultaneously be a source for a Type A sub-function (e.g. source cooling
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pump for cooling) and a sink for a Type B sub-function (e.g. sink cooling pump for power).
By using a directed (flow) network, in combinationwith the robustness evaluation indicator
metric that accepts the same components as sources or sinks, interdependencies among
the sub-functions are able to be captured.
3.3. Evaluation stage of themethodology
The evaluation stage includes two approaches the reformulation of robustmodular config-
uration and a high-level DOE analysis of the results. A manual process of reformulating the
robustmodular configuration, to allowanexpert’s preferences tobe input is suggested. The
robust modular configuration is formulated based on the outcome results of the analysis
stage, following the principle that a disruption to a module should not stop the functional
continuity of the architecture and that maximum modularity is favoured. The first step on
the reformulation is to select the generated modules from the maximised modular config-
uration. However, the maximisation of the degree of modularity may generate non-robust
modules. The second step is to search on substituting the non-robust modules with robust
modules generated in the mediummodular configuration. If a robust module is not found
in themedium configuration, then the low-level configuration is investigated. If in the low-
level configuration, a robust module is found, then two approaches are suggested to be
employed. The first approach is to perform additional iterations through the modularity
loop by manipulating the resolution parameter of the stability method in different values
until a substitutable robust module is identified. The second approach is to manually inter-
vene to update a specific non-robust module by removing one by one its components
and calculating the robustness, until a suitable robust module is identified. Through these
approaches, the architect can devise a final robust modular configuration for the system
architecture.
Through the application of the proposed methodology on the Networks A and B of
Figure 2, the followingmodules are identified: for NetworkA,Module 1 contains node 2 and
4 and Module 2 contains node 1 and 3 nodes, Module 3 groups nodes 5 and 7 and Module
4 clusters nodes 6 and 8. For Network B, the methodology proposed module 1 to contain
nodes 1, 3 &,5 nodes andModule 2 to contain nodes 2,4,& 6,Module 3 to group nodes 7 and
9 and Module 4 to cluster nodes 8 and 9. The generated modules were assessed in Class 1
disruption and were found to be robust. Whilst an experienced engineer could find such
robust modules in this simple power system without computational tools, this is challeng-
ing for increasingly complex systems with interconnected subsystems. The methodology
provides both a verifiable means to track decisions made during early conceptual stages,
and an objective and systematic approach to engineering systems design.
The second stageof evaluation is theDOEanalysis. Themethodologyproposes the treat-
ment ofmodularity and redundancy as two design variables of the system architecture and
uses robustness as the response variable. The robustness results accumulated by the low,
medium, and high levels of modularity and redundancy are analysed using a full factorial
DOE. Themain effects provide a basis to assess the relationship between redundancy,mod-
ularity, and robustness for the system architecture under examination. This offers insights
to guide architects and decision makers for the system architecture formulation. The final
stage of themethodology that involves the Selection is not further discussed here, as it is a
qualitative process that depends on the decision making of the users.
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4. Case study
Themethodologywasevaluatedbyapplying it in anexistingnaval distributed systemarchi-
tecture. In this section, the case study system’s functions and specification are described,
representations of the technical system architecture are illustrated, and the implementa-
tion and results generated by the methodology are presented.
4.1. Data collection
The researcher had close communication with Subject Matter Experts (SME) of the techni-
cal system architecture to develop the case study. A senior power and propulsion engineer
was involved in the development of the binary DSMs. A chief engineer was also involved to
propose the alternative systemarchitectures for the low andmedium redundancy. The out-
comeswerediscussed throughmeetings andunstructured interviewswith the engineering
manager central engineering and the engineeringmanager research & technology. Formal
permission was granted to include SME quotes in this section.
4.2. Preliminary evaluation of the robustness evaluation indicatormetric
Combined failure scenarios that would lead to a total loss of functionality were provided
by the SME based on the technical specification. These scenarios would be expected to
cause the robustness evaluation indicator metric to return a value of zero (not robust).
Examples of these scenarios include a combined loss of HV Switchboard 1 and LV Switch-
board 2; Steering Gear 1 and 2; and Chilled water manifold 1 and HV Switchboard 2. All
possible combinations of two simultaneous component failures were assessed, and the
associated robustness calculated. The results were checked against the expert’s combined
failure scenarios, providing a preliminary evaluation to allow the robustness evaluation
indicator metric utilisation in the proposed methodology.
4.3. Inputs ofmethodology
4.3.1. Definition of the system architecture
The system architecture represents a naval ship that has either electric or gas turbine (GT)
propulsion. Power is generated by four diesel generators, which supply HV switchboards,
which in turn supply two propulsion motors mounted on the propulsion shafts, and the
LV switchboards, via transformers. Each shaft can also be driven by a gas turbine via a
dedicated gearbox. The gas turbine lubrication coolers rely on seawater for cooling. The
Low-Pressure (LP) seawater system provides cooling for the transformers, and propulsion
motors. The chilled water system only supplies weapons and other systems, thus does not
influence the power and propulsion.
Figure 4 illustrates the schematic representation of the system architecture that is
divided into four parts representing the four primary systems. The upper right section
illustrates the power system, upper left illustrates the propulsion system, lower left illus-
trates the chilled water system, and the lower right section illustrates the seawater system.
The power sources (generators one to four) are positioned on the upper right section of
the schematic, whereas sinks such as propulsion motors one and two are positioned on
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Figure 4. High redundancy technical system schematic (colour online).
the left of the schematic. The figure captures the interconnectivity amongst the different
subsystems that are crucial for the system to satisfy the main function but are also
critical in case of disruptions. It also encapsulates integration across functions that are
not typically represented in practice, with multiple drawings used to reflect the individ-
ual subsystems for example the chilled water diagrams or electrical power distribution
diagrams.
The manifolds that are critical to allow various configurations of the architecture to be
instantiated are included as components. The schematic depicts the flow connections with
blue and the electrical power flow connections with black colour. The system architecture
represents naval distributed engineering systems (power, propulsion, chilled and seawa-
ter cooling systems) at normal cruising configuration, which requires a level of equipment
and connectivity to achieve the minimum functional requirements (operational demand).
After disruption, the normal cruising capability required is to be able to move and orien-
tate the ship (propulsion and steer) and to operate fighting equipment, such as the mast
or sonar. The normal cruising configuration of the system architecture has a high level of
redundancy, as the functional requirements could be achieved with different alternative
options of connectivity among the sources and sinks.
The system architecture should possess a high degree of robustness, as in the event of a
disruption; functional continuity is required to be achievable.
4.3.2. Definition of themain functions and sub-functions
The naval ship’s main function is typically described as float, move, and fight. The float
function is achieved by the design of the ship and internal subdivision and is not con-
sidered in this research. The distributed systems support the other two main functions,
which aremove and fight. The specific sub-functions (power, propulsion, chilledwater, and
seawater cooling) were selected due to their direct influence on achieving the main func-
tions of move and fight. The four sub-functions of the system architecture are examined:
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generating and distributing power to electrical distribution centres (EDCs); provide energy
(power or mechanical) for propulsion and steering; provide chilled water-cooling for com-
bat systems and power and propulsion; and, provide seawater cooling for power and
propulsion and other consumers. The system architecture provides additional function-
alities to the naval ship but is not included within this analysis. The level of functional
requirement depends on the operational scenario. For the case study, the operational sce-
nario that was examined is the State of cruising that corresponds to a minimum level of
functions.
4.3.3. Identifying the source and sink components, and determining the level of
redundancy
The functional hierarchy, options, and RTC illustrated in Figure 5 are in relation to the
existing system architecture characteristics that correspond to the high level of redun-
dancy. The architectural options represent the sets of sources and sinks that were designed
within the architecture to satisfy the sub-functions. The RTC was defined as the level of
connectivity required amongst a set of individual source and sinks in the architecture to
satisfy the corresponding function. Figure 5 shows that the RTC is 33% for the power func-
tion, as the functional requirement is satisfied if 33% connectivity is available between the
power sources and sinks. In contrast, in Figure 5 for the propulsion sub-function there are
4 options, however, each option requires 100% connectivity to be considered successful.
Specifically, a full connectivity amongst DG1 and DG 3 is required with PM1, a 100% con-
nectivity of GT1 to Gearbox 1. The RTC relates to the level functional requirement (depends
on the operational state) that the robustness of the architecture is assessed.
Figure 5. Functional hierarchy, architectural options and RTC for high redundancy technical system.
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4.4. Analysis stage ofmethodology
The analysis stage of the methodology was computationally implemented using MATLAB.
Figure 6 presents an abstraction of Figure 1 to provide focus on the iterative analysis loops
of this stage of the methodology. Figure 6 illustrates that the disruptive loop is embedded
within the modularity loop, which is embedded within the redundancy loop. That means
for a single level of redundancy, iteration through the low–medium–high level ofmodular-
ity is suggested, and for each level of modularity iteration through the module disruption
scenarios is proposed.
Redundancy and modularity are treated as the design variables that effect robustness,
that is the response variable. Redundancy is controlled through varying the additional
architectural options and the RTC of the architecture. Figure 3, which defines the functional
hierarchy, architectural options, RTC, sources, and sinks, requires to be redefined to vary
the level of redundancy in the system architecture. The alternative system architectures
with different levels of redundancy for this case study were conceived with discussions the
SME. The proposed methodology recommends architects to formulate alternative options
of the system architecture of different levels of redundancy for the analysis stage. In this
article case study, the low level of redundancy represents an option of an architecture with
Figure 6. Redundancy-modularity-disruption loops of the analysis stage.
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Table 3. Variations of the levels of redundancy in the system architecture.
DOE levels Control factor
Level of redundancy in
the system architecture
Iteration of the
redundancy loops
3 High-level Figures 4 and 5 First redundancy loop
2 Medium-level Figures 7 and 8 Second redundancy loop
1 Low-level Figures 9 and 10 Third redundancy loop
Table 4. Variations of the levels of modularity in the system architecture.
DOE levels Control factor Level of modularity Iterations of the modularity loops
1 Low-level Stability resolution parameter: 0.2 First modularity loop
2 Medium-level Stability resolution parameter: 0.5 Second modularity loop
3 High-level Stability resolution parameter: 1 Third modularity loop
almost zero redundancy (other than for propulsion),whilst themedium level of redundancy
represents an option of an architecture with approximately double redundancy. The exist-
ing system architecture represents the high level of redundancy as illustrated in Figure 4.
Table 3 associates the iterations of the redundancy loop with the low–medium–high
redundancyandprovides a referenceon the figures that arepresented in followingSections
4.4.1–4.4.3.
Modularity is treated as a design variable and its levels are manipulated using the sta-
bility method. The resolution parameter of the stability method was used to control the
modularity as a design variable. Through the variation of the resolution parameter, the level
ofmodularity in the systemarchitecturewas controlled as shown in Table 4 in each iteration
of the modularity loop.
In the following section, the modular configurations generated for different levels of
modularity and redundancy are presented.
4.4.1. First redundancy loop
Table 5 presents the low, medium, and high modularity intermediate loop results, for the
high redundancy architecture. The highlighted cells within the Tables illustrate non-robust
modules whilst all other cells illustrate robust modules. Tables 5–7 encapsulate the results
from all iterations of the redundancy, modularity, and disruption loops.
The high level of modularity generates a smaller number and largest in sizes modules,
whereas the low level of modularity generates higher number modules of smaller size.
Amongst the high andmedium level of modularity a specific non-robust module was iden-
tified (EDC 1, EDC 2, CW Plant Chiller 1, CW Plant Chiller 2, CW Plant Chiller 1 – Manifold, CW
Plant Chiller 2 – Manifold, Essential Consumer1 – Mast, Essential Consumer2 –Sonar). For
the low level of modularity, this non-robust module is divided into two modules, whereas
the one becomes robust (Module 12: EDC 1, CW Plant Chiller 1, Essential Consumer2 –
Sonar) and the other remains non-robust (Module 13: EDC 2, CW Plant Chiller 2, CW Plant
Chiller 1 – Manifold, CW Plant Chiller 2 – Manifold, Essential Consumer1 – Mast).
4.4.2. Second redundancy loop
The system architecture level of redundancy was varied in the second redundancy loop to
represent a medium (double) level of redundancy in the architecture (Figures 7 and 8).
Table 6 presents the results of the modularity loops for system architecture of medium
level of redundancy.
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Table 5. Modular configurations for high redundancy technical system.
First redundancy loop
High level of redundancy in the system architecture
First modularity loop Second modularity loop Third modularity loop
Module ID Low level of modularity Medium level of modularity High level of modularity
1 Gas Turbine 2, Gearbox 2, GT LO Cooler 2 Gas Turbine 1, Gearbox 1, GT LO Cooler 1 Gas Turbine 2, Gearbox 2, GT LO Cooler 2
2 Gas Turbine 1, Gearbox 1, GT LO Cooler 1 Gas Turbine 2, Gearbox 2, GT LO Cooler 2 Diesel Generator 2, Diesel Generator 4, Transformer 2, HV Switchboard
2, HV Switchboard Inter1, HV Switchboard Inter2, Propulsion Motor
2, Converter Regular 2, LP Sea Water Pump Manifold 2
3 Diesel Generator 1, Diesel Generator 3, HV
Switchboard 1, HV Switchboard Inter1, HV
Switchboard Inter2
Diesel Generator 1, Diesel Generator 3,
Transformer 1, HV Switchboard 1
LV Switchboard 1, LV Switchboard Inter2, EDC 3, EDC 5, Steering Gear
Hydraulic Power Pack 1, CW Plant Chiller 3, LP Sea Water Pump 1
4 Diesel Generator 2, Diesel Generator 4,
Transformer 2, HV Switchboard 2
Diesel Generator 2, Diesel Generator 4, HV
Switchboard 2, HV Switchboard Inter1, HV
Switchboard Inter2
Gas Turbine 1, Gearbox 1, Diesel Generator 1, Diesel Generator 3,
Transformer 1, HV Switchboard 1, Propulsion Motor 1, Converter
Regular 1, LP Sea Water Pump Manifold 1, GT LO Cooler 1
5 Emergency Generator, Emergency Switchboard Emergency Generator, Emergency Switchboard EDC 1, EDC 2, CW Plant Chiller 1, CW Plant Chiller 2, CW Plant Chiller 1
– Manifold, CW Plant Chiller 2 – Manifold, CW Plant Chiller 3 –
Manifold, Essential Consumer1 – Mast, Essential Consumer2 – Sonar
6 EDC 4, LP Sea Water Pump 2 EDC 1, EDC 2, CW Plant Chiller 1, CW Plant Chiller
2, CW Plant Chiller 1 – Manifold, CW Plant
Chiller 2 – Manifold, Essential Consumer1 –
Mast, Essential Consumer2 – Sonar
LV Switchboard 2, LV Switchboard Inter1, Emergency Generator,
Emergency Switchboard, EDC 4, EDC 6, Steering Gear Hydraulic
Power Pack 2, LP Sea Water Pump 2
7 LV Switchboard 1, LV Switchboard Inter2, EDC 5,
Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 1
LV Switchboard 1, LV Switchboard Inter2, EDC 5,
Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 1
8 LV Switchboard 2, LV Switchboard Inter1, EDC 6,
Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 2
EDC 3, Propulsion Motor 1, Converter Regular
1, LP Sea Water Pump 1, LP Sea Water Pump
Manifold 1
9 Propulsion Motor 1, Converter Regular 1, LP Sea
Water Pump Manifold 1
Transformer 2, Propulsion Motor 2, Converter
Regular 2, LP Sea Water Pump Manifold 2
10 Propulsion Motor 2, Converter Regular 2, LP Sea
Water Pump Manifold 2
LV Switchboard 2, LV Switchboard Inter1, EDC 6,
Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 2
11 EDC 1, CW Plant Chiller 1, Essential Consumer2 –
Sonar
CW Plant Chiller 3, CW Plant Chiller 3 – Manifold
12 CW Plant Chiller 3, CW Plant Chiller 3 – Manifold EDC 4, LP Sea Water Pump 2
(continued)
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Table 5. Continued.
First redundancy loop
High level of redundancy in the system architecture
First modularity loop Second modularity loop Third modularity loop
Module ID Low level of modularity Medium level of modularity High level of modularity
13 EDC 2, CW Plant Chiller 2, CW Plant Chiller 1 –
Manifold, CW Plant Chiller 2 – Manifold,
Essential Consumer1 – Mast
14 EDC 3, LP Sea Water Pump 1
15 Transformer 1
Modularity metric 0.72 0.75 0.8
Classification of modules (Modules ID)
central modules [3] [6] [4]
peripheral modules [5,6,9,10,12,14] [5,11,12] [1]
semi peripheral modules [1,2,4,7,8,11,13,15] [1,2,3,4,7,8,9,10] [2,3,5,6]
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Table 6. Modular configurations for medium redundancy technical system.
Second redundancy loop
Medium level of redundancy in the system architecture
First modularity loop Second modularity loop Third modularity loop
Module ID Low level of modularity Medium level of modularity High level of modularity
1 Gas Turbine 2, Gearbox 2, GT LO Cooler 2 Gas Turbine 2, Gearbox 2, GT LO Cooler 2 Gas Turbine 1, Gearbox 1, GT LO Cooler 1
2 Gas Turbine 1, Gearbox 1, GT LO Cooler 1 Gas Turbine 1, Gearbox 1, GT LO Cooler 1 Diesel Generator 1, Transformer 1, HV Switchboard 1, HV Switchboard
Inter1, Propulsion Motor 1, Converter Regular 1, LP Sea Water Pump
Manifold 1
3 Diesel Generator 1, Transformer 1, HV
Switchboard 1
Diesel Generator 2, Transformer 2, HV
Switchboard 2, HV Switchboard Inter1
LV Switchboard 1, LV Switchboard Inter1, Emergency Generator,
Emergency Switchboard, EDC 3, EDC 5, Steering Gear Hydraulic
Power Pack 1, LP Sea Water Pump 1
4 Diesel Generator 2, HV Switchboard 2, HV
Switchboard Inter1
Diesel Generator 1, Transformer 1, HV
Switchboard 1
EDC 1, EDC 2, CW Plant Chiller 1, CW Plant Chiller 2, CW Plant Chiller 1
– Manifold, CW Plant Chiller 2 – Manifold, Essential Consumer1 –
Mast, Essential Consumer2 –Sonar
5 EDC 3, LP Sea Water Pump 1 LV Switchboard 1, LV Switchboard Inter1, EDC 5,
Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 1
Gas Turbine 2, Gearbox 2, Diesel Generator 2, Transformer 2, HV
Switchboard 2, Propulsion Motor 2, Converter Regular 2, LP Sea
Water PumpManifold 2, GT LO Cooler 2
6 Transformer 2, LV Switchboard 2 Emergency Generator, Emergency Switchboard,
EDC 6, Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 2
LV Switchboard 2, EDC 4, EDC 6, Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 2,
LP Sea Water Pump 2
7 LV Switchboard 1, EDC 5 EDC 1, EDC 2, CW Plant Chiller 1, CW Plant Chiller
2, CW Plant Chiller 1 – Manifold, CW Plant
Chiller 2 – Manifold, Essential Consumer1 –
Mast, Essential Consumer2 – Sonar
8 Propulsion Motor 2, Converter Regular 2, LP Sea
Water Pump Manifold 2
Propulsion Motor 1, Converter Regular 1, LP Sea
Water Pump Manifold 1
9 Propulsion Motor 1, Converter Regular 1, LP Sea
Water Pump Manifold 1
Propulsion Motor 2, Converter Regular 2, LP Sea
Water Pump Manifold 2
10 LV Switchboard Inter1, Steering Gear Hydraulic
Power Pack 1
EDC 3, LP Sea Water Pump 1
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11 Emergency Generator, Emergency Switchboard, EDC 6,
Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 2
LV Switchboard 2, EDC 4, LP Sea Water Pump 2
12 EDC 1, CW Plant Chiller 1, Essential Consumer2 – Sonar
13 EDC 2, CW Plant Chiller 2, CW Plant Chiller 1 –
Manifold, CW Plant Chiller 2 – Manifold,
Essential Consumer1 – Mast
14 EDC 4, LP Sea Water Pump 2
Modularity metric 0.71 0.78 0.84
Classification of modules (Modules ID)
central modules [11] [7] [5]
peripheral modules [5,6,7,8, 9,10,14] [8,9,10] [1]
semi peripheral modules [1,2,3,4, 12,13] [1,2,3,4,5,6,11] [2,3,4,6]
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Figure 7. Medium redundancy technical system schematic (colour online).
Figure 8. Functional hierarchy, architectural options, andRTC formedium redundancy technical system.
The results generated for themedium redundancy share similaritieswith the results gen-
erated for the high level of redundancy. This suggests that iterating through the various
levels of redundancy and modularity for the same system architecture can help architects
identify common robust modules. This could allow potential standardisation and com-
monality design initiatives to be implemented. Identifying standard and common robust
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modules can help to develop library robust modules that can be used at the beginning of
the design.
4.4.3. Third redundancy loop
The system architecture level of redundancy is manipulated in the third redundancy loop
to reflect to a system architecture with a low level of redundancy (Figures 9 and 10). This
Figure 9. Low redundancy technical system schematic (colour online).
Figure 10. Functional hierarchy, architectural options and RTC for low redundancy technical system.
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Table 7. Modular configurations for low redundancy technical system.
Third redundancy loop
Low level of redundancy in the system architecture
First modularity loop Second modularity loop Third modularity loop
Module ID Low level of modularity Medium level of modularity High level of modularity
1 Gas Turbine 2, Gearbox 2, GT LO Cooler 2 Gas Turbine 1, Gearbox 1, GT LO Cooler 1 Gas Turbine 2, Gearbox 2, GT LO Cooler 2
2 Gas Turbine 1, Gearbox 1, GT LO Cooler 1 Gas Turbine 2, Gearbox 2, Propulsion Motor 1 Transformer 1, Transformer 2, LV Switchboard 1, LV Switchboard
Inter2, Emergency Generator
3 Diesel Generator 1, Transformer 1, HV
Switchboard 1
Diesel Generator 1, Diesel Generator 2, Diesel
Generator 3
Gas Turbine 1, Gearbox 1, LV Switchboard 2, HV Switchboard
Inter1, HV Switchboard Inter2, LV Switchboard Inter1, EDC 5,
EDC 6
4 LV Switchboard 1 Transformer 1, Transformer 2, LV Switchboard 1,
LV Switchboard Inter2, Emergency Generator
HV Switchboard 1, Emergency Switchboard, EDC 1, EDC 2, EDC 3
5 Emergency Generator, Emergency
Switchboard, Steering Gear Hydraulic
Power Pack 2
HV Switchboard Inter1, LV Switchboard Inter1,
EDC 5
Diesel Generator 1, Diesel Generator 2, Diesel Generator 3, Diesel
Generator 4, HV Switchboard 2, EDC 4
6 EDC 3, LP Sea Water Pump 1 LV Switchboard 2, HV Switchboard Inter2
7 EDC 5, Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 1 HV Switchboard 1, Emergency Switchboard, EDC
1, EDC 2, EDC 3
8 Propulsion Motor 2, Converter Regular 2 Diesel Generator 4, HV Switchboard 2, EDC 4
9 Propulsion Motor 1, Converter Regular 1
10 EDC 1, CW Plant Chiller 1
11 CW Plant Chiller 1 – Manifold, Essential
Consumer1 – Mast, Essential Consumer2 –
Sonar
12 EDC 5
Modularity metric 0.71 0.85 0.9
Classification of modules (Modules ID)
central modules [1,2,3,5, 11] [4] [5]
periphery modules [6,7,8,9,10] [5,6] [1]
semi periphery modules [4,12] [1,2,3,7,8] [2,3,4]
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is achieved by minimising the level of connectivity and number of the source components
in the system architecture. The low redundancy system architecture is able to achieve the
main function defined as move and fight, however, in a naval engineering context, would
not satisfy vulnerability design requirements. Hence, this is not a realistic architecture in the
naval context, and is used as an ideal architecture, for comparison and analysis purposes.
Table 7 presents the modular configurations for the given low redundancy system
architecture. This lowest redundancy architecture has the highest degree of modularity;
compare against the medium and high-level architectures (low-level redundancy calcu-
lates maximum 0.9 degree of modularity, medium level redundancy calculates maximum
0.84 degree of modularity, high-level redundancy calculates maximum 0.8 degree of mod-
ularity). However, the potential to generate robust modularisation was lowest as shown in
Table 7, whereas most of the modules generated were non-robust (highlighted cells).
4.5. Output: robustness results for given level of redundancy andmodularity
Table 8 presents the accumulate robustness results post a single module disruption for the
different levels of redundancy and modularity.
Table 8 indicates that the highest robustness results (0.757) were for a high level of
redundancy combined with a lowest level of modularity, which is an expected outcome.
A surprised result is that for low level of redundancy and modularity and for high level of
redundancy andmodularity, the same level of robustness is calculated (0.467). Themedium
level of redundancy andmodularity calculates an average robustness 0.7, which is 0.55 less
than the best robustness results. The calculated robustness values are functioning as quan-
titative evaluation indicators to compare amongst different types of system architecture,
and their meaningfulness relates to such comparison purposes.
4.6. Evaluation stage of themethodology
Following the recommendations of the evaluation stage of the proposed methodology
(Section 3.3), the robust modular configurations for the various levels of redundancy were
devised. Moreover, the DOE analysis was performed based on the average robustness
results presented in Table 8, to gain an overview of the effects of the different levels of
modularity and redundancy to robustness
4.6.1. Robust modular configurations
Table 9 presents the robust modular configuration devised following the steps explained
in the evaluation stage of the proposed methodology as discussed in Section 3.3.
The robust modular configuration ensures that in case of a module disruption the sys-
tem continues functioning. The low redundancy architecture was not illustrated as it is
not an appropriate solution to allow robust modularisation. Figures 11 and 12 illustrate
the robust module configuration, given that there is medium and high redundancy that
corresponds to the findings presented in Table 9. There were seven robust modules identi-
fied for the medium redundancy architecture as seen in Figure 11, and seven modules for
the high redundancy architecture as seen in Figure 12. The different colours illustrate the
modules.
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Table 8. Robustness results.
Design variables Response variable
RUNS Level of redundancy Level of modularity Level of robustness
Run 1 Low Low 0.467
Run 2 Low Medium 0.361
Run 3 Low High 0.192
Run 4 Medium Low 0.745
Run 5 Medium Medium 0.702
Run 6 Medium High 0.544
Run 7 High Low 0.757
Run 8 High Medium 0.730
Run 9 High High 0.467
The robust modular configuration for both themedium and high redundancy ensures a
high level (notmaximum)ofmodularity in the systemarchitecture by enabling thepartition
into modules without a penalisation of the robustness. The robust modular configurations
were discussed with the SMEs who advised that they considered the modules to be logical
in the context of a naval design given that typically at least a minimum level of double
redundancy exists across the systems (in specific subsystems the level of redundancy could
be either triple or quadruple). The SME commented:
The module suggestions are interesting and provide a start point for consideration. There is
sound logic in their formulation but transforming into a ship of course requires a bit more con-
sideration, generally of constraints. For example, the orange modules have a diesel generator
and propulsion motor. It may not be possible to provide enough longitudinal separation for
the diesel generators given the constraints on motor location within the ship perhaps leading
to the need to split each of these modules into two. This does not devalue the results in any
way as they give a good starting point for the design which has already been shown to display
the characteristics required.
The methodology provides an early formulation of robust modular configuration that
shows compliance with the design requirements of robustness, modularity, and redun-
dancy. Spatial constraints were not considered, and it was expected that revisions of the
proposed robust modular configuration would be required. Establishing a foundation for
a robust modular configuration provided a compass for architects to direct the design
towards the desired requirements.
The SME noted ‘High level of modularity is not necessarily better than medium level
of modularity when all considerations of build ability, installation, setting to work etc.
are considered. Obviously, the benefits of modularity will need to be assessed for each
possible configuration.’ The desirable level of modularity is subject to other aspects and
trade-offs that architects are expected to take into consideration. This was the reason
that the methodology was constructed using a tuneable method to identify modules that
correspond to different levels of modularity.
In relation to redundancy, the SME commented
The observation that increasing redundancy for a similar level of modularity does not nec-
essarily increase robustness is to be expected as some of the larger modules start to contain
redundant systems, for example two generators in a single module. The results for all modules
in Table 9 therefore seem logical.
Redundancy at a component level requires investigation to ensure that it contributes to
improving robustness. In response to disruption, the existence of redundant components
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Table 9. Robust modular configurations for medium and high redundancy technical systems.
MODULE ID
Medium level of redundancy
in the architecture
High level of redundancy
in the architecture
1 Gas Turbine 1, Gas Turbine 2,
Gearbox 1, Gearbox 2,
GT LO Cooler 1 GT LO Cooler 2
2 Diesel Generator 1, Diesel Generator 2,
Transformer 1, Diesel Generator 4,
HV Switchboard 1, Transformer 2,
HV Switchboard Inter1, HV Switchboard 2,
Propulsion Motor 1, HV Switchboard Inter1, HV Switchboard
Converter Regular 1, Inter2, Propulsion Motor 2,
LP Sea Water PumpManifold 1 Converter Regular 2,
LP Sea Water Pump Manifold 2
3 LV Switchboard 1, LV Switchboard 1,
LV Switchboard Inter1, LV Switchboard Inter2,
Emergency Generator, EDC 3,
Emergency Switchboard, EDC 5,
EDC 3, Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 1,
EDC 5, CW Plant Chiller 3,
Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 1, CW Plant Chiller 3 – Manifold,
LP Sea Water Pump 1 LP Sea Water Pump 1
4 EDC 1, Gas Turbine 1,
CW Plant Chiller 1, Gearbox 1,
Essential Consumer1 – Mast, Diesel Generator 1,
CW Plant Chiller 1 – Manifold Diesel Generator 3,
Transformer 1,
HV Switchboard 1,
Propulsion Motor 1,
Converter Regular 1,
LP Sea Water Pump Manifold 1,
GT LO Cooler 1
5 EDC 2, CW Plant Chiller 2, EDC 1,
CW Plant Chiller 2 – Manifold, CW Plant Chiller 1,
Essential Consumer2 – Sonar CW Plant Chiller 1 – Manifold,
Essential Consumer1 – Mast
6 Gas Turbine 2, EDC 2,
Gearbox 2, CW Plant Chiller 2,
Diesel Generator 2, CW Plant Chiller 2 – Manifold,
Transformer 2, Essential Consumer2 –Sonar
HV Switchboard 2,
Propulsion Motor 2,
Converter Regular 2,
LP Sea Water PumpManifold 2,
GT LO Cooler 2
7 LV Switchboard 2, LV Switchboard 2,
EDC 4, LV Switchboard Inter1,
EDC 6, Emergency Generator,
Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 2, Emergency Switchboard,
LP Sea Water Pump 2 EDC 4,
EDC 6,
Steering Gear Hydraulic Power Pack 2,
LP Sea Water Pump 2
Modularity metric 0.78 0.76
Robustness metric 0.70 0.64
does not ensure the robustness of the architecture. It was, however, acknowledged that
such redundancy was included for reliability and availability reasons rather for than sur-
viving an extensive disruption relating for example to damage within all components of a
module.
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Figure 11. Robust modular configuration for medium redundancy technical system (colour online).
Figure 12. Robust modular configuration for high redundancy technical system (colour online).
With respect to the methodology, the SME provided the following observations:
Being able to understand the trade-offs between redundancy, robustness and modularity has
got to be a good thing! I think this helps make sense of conflicting requirements. It is always
easier to develop a design when you have some start points even if they are not perfect.
The robust modular configurations were systematically generated through the appli-
cation of the proposed methodology, and can offer a foundation for the design, that has
demonstrated early compliance with the design requirements of redundancy, modular-
ity and robustness. Grouping components into robust modules could help the system
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architect to develop the foundation for robust modular system architecture at the early
design stages within the system development process where critical decisions are taken,
and before detail engineering design and production take place. The methodology could
be used to support architects and decision makers to take decisions at the right trajectory
during the conceptual stages that can lead to significant improvements associating with
cost, development time, and operational capability.
4.6.2. DOE analysis: redundancy andmodularity effects on robustness
Figure 13 illustrates the results of the DOE analysis on redundancy and modularity effects
on robustness which were calculated using the results of Table 8.
Figure 13 indicates that an increase in themodularity level, negatively affects robustness.
This preliminary observation was expected, as disrupting a module of highest modularity
would lead on the loss of a bigger size module that contains a higher number of compo-
nents in the architecture. Medium redundancy compared to low redundancy, significantly
improves robustness. However, high redundancy compared to medium redundancy does
not continue to improve robustness of the architecture, subject to a module disruption,
at the same extent. This observation is subject to the type of system architecture under
examination, the type of disruption the robustness is calculated against and the type of
redundancy. This observation is noteworthy because increasing redundancy has cost impli-
cations; it increases the spatial and power requirements; increases weight; and has a higher
susceptibility for accidents and errors when relying on additional components and connec-
tions to satisfy function. From an engineering system perspective, a desired solution is to
achieve robustness with increased modularity and reduced redundancy.
Figure 13. Redundancy and modularity main effects on robustness (colour online).
JOURNAL OF ENGINEERING DESIGN 213
The decision on the level ofmodularity and redundancy is suggested as situation depen-
dent on the system architecture under examination and the specific desired requirements
relating with redundancy, modularity, and robustness. The proposed methodology is sug-
gested to be applied in particular instances of system architectures, and the evaluation
stage depends on the specific design requirements established concerning redundancy,
modularity, and robustness.
With respect to the naval distributed system architecture, increasing from low to
medium redundancy significantly increased the robustness. The high redundancy (redun-
dancy of source components and connections) was not found to considerably improve
the robustness of the system architecture under a module’s disruption. The increase in
the level of modularity leads to an increase in the size of modules. If a disruption were
to happen to a large-sized module, a higher number of components (which includes
the adjacently redundant component) would be simultaneously lost, meaning that the
redundant component will not offer additional contribution to the robustness of the
architecture.
Reflecting on the results in Tables 5–7 is also observed that for the low redundancy archi-
tecture the highest modularity is generated. This general finding confirms that increasing
redundancy can lead also to reducing the potential to modularise the system architec-
ture. The findings of the application of the methodology the naval technical system pro-
moted the notion that a medium redundancy and a medium level of modularity could
be an acceptable trade-off for satisfying a level of robustness of the system architecture.
This is suggested considering the desired trade-offs which rely on the level of modu-
larity, the considerations for redundancy and the situation depended on nature of the
problem.
4.7. Reflections on the classification ofmodules
The proposed classification of modules was a construct proposed to investigate the archi-
tectural role ofmodules in the systemarchitecture. Thenetwork theory concept of diameter
was adapted to suggest the classification of modules. Diameter in network theory is used
as an analogy with the survivability concept of damage extent. This analogy suggested an
approximation between damage extent and diameter that allows correlation between the
network and the instantiated system architecture. The damage extent in the survivability
context is the physical length between components that are vulnerable to impairment by
a disruption.
Based on the results of this article’s technical case study, inferences on the association
of the classes of modules were made. Peripheral modules were deduced to have an asso-
ciation with the survivability damage extent. Central modules were deduced to have an
association with system functionality. For semi-peripheral modules, their association with
functionality or survivability was less pronounced.
A high diameter implies a higher length amongst nodes in the network, which was
assumed to relate with increased separation amongst components in the system and a
higher damage extent, increasing the possibility of impairment following disruption. Based
on this analogy, it was suggested that the peripheral module, which has the maximum
diameter and therefore the maximum damage extent, was consequently the most likely
type of module to be affected by disruption.
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Accepting that peripheral modules have a high possibility to be disrupted, this suggests
that a higher level of modularity could be preferable for specific periphery modules, given
that concentration of components into highly coherent peripheral modules is preferable.
The central modules in the technical system case studies were observed to hold a high
proportionof system functionality. These imply that the largest sized centralmodules could
endanger the robustness of the architecture under high level of modularity as developing
large size modules and given these are central, their disruptionmay lose a high proportion
of the functionality of the system.
Semi-periphery modules are suggested to have a reduced association with surviv-
ability damage length (peripheral) and system functionality (central) and therefore offer
opportunities for further manipulation, and updates. For example, in the case studies the
non-robust module that was required to be updated to reformulate the robust modular
configuration was a semi-periphery module.
It is expected that a different analogywouldbe appropriate for different systemarchitec-
tures which will generate different results; thus the findings are not suggested for general-
isation. This discussion suggests the development of different rules and recommendations
to formulate the new robust modular configuration. If architects find analogies and associ-
ations between classes ofmoduleswith other requirements and design requirements, then
new principles could be developed for selecting modules. For example, another principle
could be that the semi-periphery robust module of themaximummodular configuration is
most preferable.
Thepurposeof classifyingmoduleswas tooffer anadditionalmeans toexpand the inves-
tigation, by supporting architects in reflectingon the architectural role andbehaviour of the
different classes of modules.
5. Conclusion
This article reports the development of a methodology to support in the early concep-
tual design of a robust modular system architecture given the level of redundancy. The
methodology supports an investigation of the level of redundancy and modularity, allow-
ing a high-level trade-off of their effects on robustness to be assessed. The methodology
supports the formulation of robust module configurations for given levels of redundancy
in the system architecture; a trade-off assessment of the effect of the different levels of
modularity and redundancy on robustness.
A robustness evaluation indicatormetric is proposed thatwasbasedon theprinciple that
source and sink components are required to remain sufficiently connected to support func-
tional continuity after adisruption. The level of connectivity to achieve functional continuity
relates also with the redundancy level designed in the architecture. Module disruptions
to the system architecture were used as an input to calculate the robustness evaluation
indicator metric.
A distributed system consisting of the electrical power system, propulsion, and steering,
chilled water and sea water systems from a naval ship was used as a basis to evaluate the
methodology. Modularity was found to affect the robustness of systems in different ways
depending on its level, and the existing level of redundancy in the architecture.
This methodology is best used during the early concept phase of a design of system
architecture, particularly when there is a range of options to assess. The broad description
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of the system and main functions can be expressed with a minimum of detail. It may be
of particular use where novel concepts are to be assessed, minimising the imposition of
existing design constraints. In addition, the development of network representations of
the system functions may identify areas where small changes or concessions could lead
to improvements in design with reduced complexity or redundancy.
The early indications of modularity and robustness can identify problem areas where
alternatives can be easily assessed and recommendationsmade for the next, more detailed
design cycle, including reduced system complexity; system layout, concentration and
separation; and, potential areas of redundancy.
One limitation of the research is that it does not investigate how modularity supports
the system’s robustness dynamically. The independence of modules means that they can
fail without propagating the effects to the whole system, thus reducing the possibility of
a spread of disruptions. Another limitation is that other factors that influence robustness
such as the style of the pattern and the complexity of the architecture were not inves-
tigated. A future research direction will be to apply the methodology in different types
of system architecture and to investigate how other characteristics and properties of the
system architecture affect the modularity, redundancy, and robustness.
The research demonstrates the development and evaluation of a novel robust modular
system architecture assessment methodology. The methodology intends to aid with the
selection of components to be grouped into robust modules and that offers a trade-off
analysis of the redundancy, modularity, and robustness relationship in the early concep-
tual stages of design. This allows experimentation with the different combinations of the
levels of modularity and redundancy to achieve robustness of system architecture. Such
knowledge at the early conceptual stages of design supports more informed decisions on
the selection of the right robustmodular systemarchitecture that is alignedwith the design
requirements of the system. It is recommended that the formulation of robustmodular sys-
tem architecture can function as a valuable foundation to basis detailed design decisions,
andpositively contribute on realising cost, development time and survivability advantages.
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